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Sunday, October 15, 2017

The "War after ISIS" begins in Iraq

by: Jennifer Cafarella and Omer Kassim with Najjam Malik


Key Takeaway: A battle is underway between the Iraqi Government, backed by Iran, and Iraqi Kurds for control of Kirkuk, Iraq. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Counterterrorism Services (CTS), Federal Police, and Iranian-backed popular mobilization forces (PMF) launched a combined offensive with intent to seize the K1 military base, the Kirkuk airport, and Kirkuk’s oilfields from Kurdish Peshmerga forces at 2:00 a.m. on October 15th. The offensive follows two days of failed negotiations after the government of Iraq (GOI), backed by Iran, demanded Kurdish forces withdraw. US efforts to de-escalate failed. Iran’s role in the offensive further strengthens its influence within Iraq, sidelines the U.S., and will increase Arab Shiite popular support for Iranian-backed candidates in Iraq’s upcoming elections, currently scheduled for April 2018. Iran’s use of an Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) against U.S. forces in Salah al Din Province, southwest of Kirkuk, on October 1 likely signals Iran’s resolve to use force to deter the U.S. from taking a direct military role. ISW is monitoring the situation and will provide regular updates.

What happened: Elements from a combined force of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Counterterrorism Services (CTS), Federal Police, and Iranian-backed popular mobilization forces (PMF) south of Kirkuk City launched a probing attack against Peshmerga forces southwest of Kirkuk at 2:00 a.m. on October 15th. The Iranian-backed units include the Badr Organization’s Turkmen Brigade (the 16th PMU brigade) and three brigades from Asai’b Ahl al-Haq (the 41st, 42nd and 43rd PMU brigades). Clashes are ongoing in the industrial zone southwest of Kirkuk City at the time of writing.

Context: The Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the government of Iraq (GoI) have been in a standoff after the KRG held a referendum on September 25, 2017 to affirm its right to declare independence. The governments of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey have strongly opposed the Kurdish referendum and took action to compel the KRG to stop short of declaring independence.The Iraqi Supreme Court declared the referendum illegal on September 18th, pending legal review. The Iraqi government and Iran both prohibited flights to Kurdistan. Iraq held military exercises with Iran along the latter’s border with Iraqi Kurdistan on October 1 and conducted symbolic military exercises with Turkey on September 26 in order to demonstrate solidarity against the referendum. Iraq’s Council of Representatives (CoR) voted on September 27 to authorize Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi to retake Kirkuk and its oil fields, prompting a Kurdish boycott of the CoR.

The Iraqi Kurds have thus faced a decision about whether to declare outright independence from Baghdad after receiving a popular mandate to do so through the referendum. Intra-Kurdish divisions both within Iraq’s main Kurdish political parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), complicated the Kurds’ way forward. KRG President Masoud Barzani, the President of the KRG and head of the KDP, has been the referendum’s staunchest supporter. His chief lifetime rival, Jalal Talabani, died on October 3, 2017 after a stroke in 2012 and protracted hospitalization. Talabani’s death accelerated a pre-existing competition for leadership over the PUK movement between his family and a separate sub-faction led by KRG vice president Kosrut Rasoul. The battle for Kirkuk will unify the PUK and KDP in defense of the Kurdish region despite their political differences. Its outcome will likely affect the timeline of KRG elections currently scheduled for November 1, 2017.

What changed: The government of Iraq backed by Iran began to compel Iraqi Kurdistan into withdrawing its armed forces from Kirkuk on October 12. Baghdad and Tehran separately issued ultimatums to the KRG. Prime Minister Haider al Abadi and leader of the Iranian-proxy Badr Organization, Hadi al Ameri, both issued statements on October 13 demanding Kurdish forces relinquish unilateral control over Kirkuk. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani traveled to Iraq and likely delivered a direct ultimatum from Ayatollah Ali Al Khameni to Kurdish leader. He also delivered a message of Khameni’s support to Abadi. He remains in Iraqi Kurdistan at the time of writing, according to local reports.

The joint Iraqi-Iranian demand followed the deployment of a combined force of Iranian-backed militias, Federal Police, and the 9th Iraqi Armored Division to frontline positions with the Kurdish Peshmerga south and west of Kirkuk City on October 12th. Local Kurdish Peshmerga commanders claimed that the local PMF and ISF commanders demanded Peshmerga forces withdraw from oil installations, the Kirkuk airport, and the K1 military base within 48 hours, citing a decision from Prime Minister Abadi. The KDP and PUK immediately deployed as many as 6,000 reinforcements to Kirkuk and withdrew from areas west and south of Kirkuk City in order to consolidate a new defensive perimeter. A lethal Iranian proxy group, AAH, attacked the headquarters of the PUK in Tuz Khurmatu, a disputed Kurdish and Shiite Turkmen town, overnight on October 13. The attack signaled Iran’s commitment to fight if the Kurds refused to back down.

Iraqi Kurds initially attempted to de-escalate the situation in Kirkuk without relinquishing control of the installations and facilities demanded by Abadi. The Kurdish President of Iraq Fuad Masum traveled to Suleimaniya on October 14 to mediate a possible resolution of the standoff in Kirkuk. He later met with leadership from both the PUK and the KDP in Dokan, Suleimaniya province and then delivered a five-point proposal to Baghdad. Baghdad rejected the proposal.

Implications: The attack against Kurdish forces in Kirkuk could lead to full-sale war between the KRG and government of Iraq. Iran’s role in the offensive further strengthens its influence within GoI and will increase Arab Shiite popular support for Iranian-backed candidates in Iraq’s upcoming elections, currently scheduled for April 2018. It also sidelines the U.S. Iran’s likely use of an Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) against U.S. forces in Salah al Din Province, southwest of Kirkuk, on October 1 likely signals Iran’s resolve to use force to deter a direct U.S. military role, if necessary.

ISW is monitoring the situation and will provide regular updates.

Thursday, October 12, 2017

Return of Signature Iranian Explosive Could Signal Escalation in Iraq

Jennifer Cafarella

Key Takeaway: The return of a signature Iranian explosive device in Iraq could indicate that Iran may already have escalated against U.S. forces in Iraq either to deter the roll out of a new US strategy against Iran, or to retaliate against it.

President Trump has signaled his intent to decertify the Iranian nuclear agreement and is scheduled to announce a new counter-Iran strategy on October 13th. Iranian officials have signaled that Iran may take military action against US forces in the region if the U.S. takes harsh steps against Iran such as designating Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization. Iranian proxies in Iraq that once fought against the US have also repeatedly signaled their intent to oust US forces from Iraq after defeating ISIS. The spokesman for Katai'b Hezbollah stated that "we look at America as our first enemy" in early 2017, for example. Iran is most likely to use its proxies to escalate in Iraq, where US forces are vulnerable. 

A high-end Iranian signature weapon, an Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP), killed U.S. soldier Specialist Alexander W. Missildine and wounded another soldier on a major road in Iraq’s Salahuddin Province on October 1st. The U.S. military is still investigating the origin of the explosive. Yet Iran is the likely perpetrator. The EFP is a high-end explosive device that Iran previously provided to its proxies in Iraq to kill U.S. soldiers during the Iraq War. Iranian-provided EFPs killed nearly 200 US soldiers and wounded over 800 from 2005-2011 according to figures declassified by US Central Command.  

ISW and CTP forecasted in September 2017 that Iran may opt for a “most dangerous” course of action in the next six months and order its proxy forces in Iraq to attack US personnel or contractors in Iraq. The use of an EFP against US soldiers in Iraq could indicate the start of this Iranian path of escalation.

ISW and CTP forecasted that Iran’s plans in the 6 months from September 2017 will be:

Main Effort: Iran will continue to prioritize efforts to constrain, disrupt, and ultimately expel the U.S. from Syria. Iran will conduct operations to block further expansion by coalition partners on the ground, including the Syrian Kurdish YPG near Raqqa City. Iran will continue supporting operations to bolster the presence of pro-regime forces in Deir ez Zour Province in Eastern Syria. The pro-Assad coalition remains unlikely to launch major urban clearing operations in Deir ez Zour City. They will likely choose to conduct further operations to secure key oil fields and minor population centers along the Euphrates River Valley. Iran will help Assad consolidate his control over Aleppo, Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Dera’a Provinces in western Syria. Iran remains unlikely to contribute additional, large combat forces to these efforts unless required to preserve its proxies’ combat power or to counter an emergent threat to Assad. Iran will likely remain cautious in supporting operations in southern Syria to reduce the risk of a major direct conflict with Israel, which Iran is not pursuing at this time. Iran will prioritize efforts to maintain and develop the Russo-Iranian coalition as well as the Quartet with Russia, the Assad regime, and Iraq.

Main Effort: Iran will focus on political efforts in Iraq to secure its influence and the full withdrawal of U.S. forces. Iran will attempt to shape the outcome of the 2018 Iraqi Parliamentary Election in order to cultivate a favorable government in Baghdad. Iran will likely attempt to craft a coalition that sets political constraints on current Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi. Iran could alternatively seek to ensure the election of a more responsive premier. Iran will continue its efforts to establish durable influence within the ISF. Iran has a number of possible courses of action it may pursue in support of its main effort in Iraq in the next six months. They include:
  • Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA) - Iraq: The Russo-Iranian coalition takes new steps to offset the U.S. role in Iraq and set political conditions that accelerate an ultimate U.S. drawdown. Iran uses its proxies to coerce the Iraqi government into launching clearing operations in ISIS-held Tel Afar, now completed, and Hawija with heavy PMU involvement and minimal U.S. involvement (this operation is well underway). Iran uses these operations to further develop its influence within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense while sidelining the U.S. Russia offers military advisors to the ISF, PMU, or both in order to offset the U.S. role. Russia and Iran may undertake a combined effort to build up Iraq’s rotary wing capability independent from the U.S. and possibly in direct support of the PMU. Russia and Iran both pressure key Iraqi leaders, possibly including Abadi, to call for a full U.S. withdrawal from Iraq rather than a residual U.S. troop presence.
  • Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) - Iraq (A): Iran orders its proxy forces to attack U.S. personnel or U.S. contractors in Iraq in order to compel a U.S. withdrawal. This COA directly places forces at risk and might escalate beyond Iraq. It is not likely unless the U.S. decides to increase the U.S. troop presence in Iraq or to take aggressive action against Iran after the U.S. policy review concludes, such as imposing meaningful secondary sanctions against the entire IRGC. Iran’s proxies could also target U.S. personnel that deploy to Iraq to secure the highways from Jordan and Saudi Arabia to Baghdad.
  • MDCOA - Iraq (B): Iran deploys ground forces into Diyala Province in eastern Iraq in order to secure the province. This course of action is likely if ISIS shifts reinforcements to Diyala Province or has unspent capabilities there – not visible through open sources – that let ISIS achieve a major breakthrough. This COA is dangerous because it would further undermine Iraqi state sovereignty and set a precedent for foreign intervention in Iraq that could embolden Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to increase his own involvement in northern Iraq. Supporting Effort (enduring): Iran will prioritize efforts to strengthen the capabilities and cohesion of the Axis of Resistance. Iran will attempt to limit the costs of its ongoing interventions in Iraq and Syria by discouraging large-scale troop deployments or sudden, massive military campaigns by Assad. It will work to preserve and expand its existing proxy forces including Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani Shi’a militias. Iran will also continue supporting the al Houthi movement in Yemen, although it remains unlikely to expand that support dramatically in either scope or scale.

Supporting Effort (enduring): Iran will vigorously oppose the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan. It will try to block or delay a declaration of independence in principle and in practice after the independence referendum. It will use military means to deny the incorporation of contested terrain and key positions into Kurdistan. It will begin by positioning military assets to deter Kurdish forces, but is willing to use force if deterrence fails. Its primary instrument will be its proxy forces within the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units. Iranian-backed PMU are currently positioned on the southern and western borders of the oil-rich disputed Kirkuk Province, currently largely under Kurdish control. They are also present around contested areas in both Diyala and Salah al Din Provinces. Iran will also use coercive means to deter local councils in disputed areas from joining the referendum. This effort is already underway. Iran will also pressure Arab politicians to reject the referendum, and possibly to oppose it through force.

Friction: Iran’s primary source of friction will be the continued threat posed by ISIS in Iraq. Iran is unlikely to press for the rapid expulsion of the U.S. from Iraq if it would risk a resurgence by ISIS. Iran will opt to increase political pressure on Baghdad to gradually reduce and ultimately end the U.S. presence in Iraq. Iran will likely wait until after anti-ISIS operations in Kirkuk and Anbar provinces conclude to push this campaign. Iran could nonetheless orchestrate a more dramatic campaign to expel the U.S. from Iraq if it perceived a more manageable threat from ISIS and al Qaeda or a more urgent threat from the U.S. Iran could pursue this option if the U.S. attempts to increase its force posture in Iraq or challenges Iran elsewhere in the Middle East. Iran must also balance its hostile policy towards the U.S. and Israel against its obligations in the Russo-Iranian coalition. Iran will avoid generating a major confrontation with the U.S. in Syria. Iran will also refrain from openly spoiling negotiated deals between the U.S. and Russia in Syria. Iran could reevaluate its priorities if tensions escalate between the U.S. and Iran elsewhere in the Middle East. Increased pushback by the U.S. against Iran — including sanctions legislation passed this year and tougher rhetoric — remains unlikely to generate such a decision in the absence of wider threats to Iran’s core strategic interests.


Syria Situation Report: September 27 - October 10, 2017

By: ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct 

This graphic marks the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. This graphic depicts significant developments in the Syrian Civil War from September 27 – October 10, 2017. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of October 10, 2017.

Special credit to Sana Sekkarie of the Institute for the Study of War for the text of this Syria SITREP Map.



Tuesday, October 10, 2017

Moscow Seeks to Destabilize Increasingly Vulnerable Ukraine

By Franklin Holcomb and Kyle Miller

The Kremlin continued its campaign to destabilize Ukraine while political tensions in Kyiv escalated as major players began to position for 2019 elections. Ukraine took further steps toward NATO and EU integration, but key anti-corruption reforms stalled. The Kremlin’s campaign continued to focus on exploiting political, cultural, and ethnic divisions in Ukrainian society and attempting to legitimize its proxy forces in Donbas while they continued relatively low-level combat operations against Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine. The U.S. signaled broader military support for Ukraine, but it must take a holistic approach to helping Kyiv defend itself from the Kremlin’s multifaceted campaign. 

The Kremlin continued its covert and overt campaign aimed to destabilize Ukraine. Russian proxy forces in Eastern Ukraine conducted daily attacks on the positions of Ukrainian Armed Forces in the East, damaging local infrastructure and killing Ukrainian soldiers. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) also reported pro-Russian agents engaged in acts of subversion and sabotage across Ukraine designed to damage Ukrainian infrastructure and spread discontent. The SBU announced on 17 AUG that it obtained information indicating that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) was planning kinetic attacks within Ukraine. The Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff accused Russian special services of destroying a major Ukrainian arms depot in the Western province of Vinnytsia on 27 SEP, the fourth Ukrainian arms depot destroyed since the conflict began. Ukraine has been unable to halt these acts of sabotage and report that they are starting to seriously impact the Armed Forces of Ukraine's (AFU) combat readiness.

The Kremlin attempted to isolate Ukraine by exploiting Eastern European cultural, ethnic, and political tensions with mixed success. The SBU detained members of a group of saboteurs on 02 OCT in Western Ukraine before they could damage a Hungarian monument. The SBU claimed that these men had conducted similar attacks against Polish monuments, government buildings, and diplomatic facilities in Ukraine and were connected to members of the defunct pro-Russia “Party of Regions.” The Kremlin would likely have attempted to frame Ukrainian nationalists as the perpetrators of the sabotage of the Hungarian monument, as it did in the previous incidents against Polish structures. This act of sabotage was likely intended to inflame existing tensions between Hungary and Ukraine. Hungarian leaders condemned a Ukrainian education bill mandating the use of Ukrainian in school, which they argue harms the small ethnic Hungarian population in western Ukraine. Poland, Moldova, and Romania have also expressed concerns about the welfare of their ethnic populations in western Ukraine. The Kremlin will continue to use its operatives in Eastern Europe to drive wedges between European states and decrease regional political, economic, and military cooperation.

The Kremlin made a peace overture designed to allow it to posture as a responsible international actor and frame Ukraine and the West as the drivers of the conflict. The Kremlin submitted a draft resolution to the UN with terms known to be unacceptable to Kyiv calling for the deployment of peacekeepers, including Russian soldiers, to Donbas on 05 SEP. The Kremlin’s proposal limited the role of peacekeepers to protecting international monitors in restricted areas in eastern Ukraine, rather than assisting with the implementation of the Minsk II ceasefire.  The Kremlin also continued to call for Ukraine to negotiate directly with separatist forces, which would help legitimize its proxies. Ukraine and the U.S. rejected the Kremlin’s proposal. Ukraine provided a counter-proposal that called for peacekeepers to be deployed throughout the conflict zone, including the Russian-Ukrainian border, with a broad mandate to help stabilize the region. The Kremlin rejected Ukraine’s proposal and accused Kyiv of delaying the peace process, while continuing its military campaign against Ukraine.

Ukraine advanced its military integration with Western military and economic structures, while it lost momentum in its fight against corruption. The AFU furthered integration with NATO and improved joint interoperability through participation in multinational military exercises such as ‘Platinum Lion 2017’ and NATO exercise ‘Rapid Trident 2017.’  Ukraine also agreed to deepen military cooperation with Poland by expanding the role of the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian brigade. Ukraine formally entered into an Association Agreement with the EU, which will accelerate economic, judicial, and government reforms to meet EU standards, on 01 SEP. Ukrainian civil-economic reforms nonetheless showed signs of stagnation despite this progress. Ukraine failed to advance its initiative to establish much-needed independent anti-corruption courts, due to resistance from within the Ukrainian government. The last members of the independent advisory board for Ukraine’s state-owned oil and gas company Naftogaz, which had been a flagship of reforms, resigned on 21 SEP and accused the Ukrainian government of “dismantling” reform efforts. All other members of the advisory board had previously resigned and leveled similar accusations against Poroshenko’s government.

Ukraine’s domestic political volatility increased ahead of the 2019 presidential elections. Former Georgian president and former governor of Odessa Oblast, Mikheil Saakashvili, whose citizenship Poroshenko had previously revoked, entered Ukraine on 10 SEP after his supporters helped him break through Ukraine’s western border. Saakashvili condemned the Poroshenko administration for corruption and pledged to lead protests against the current government. He met with Ukrainian opposition politicians, including ‘Fatherland’ opposition party leader Yulia Tymoshenko. He also attempted to court the reformist bloc by supporting many of its policy recommendations including the formation of independent anti-corruption courts. Saakashvili is unlikely to gain enough support to challenge Poroshenko, but his momentum indicates rising discontent with Poroshenko in Ukraine’s reformist coalition. Pro-Russia political players are also setting conditions ahead of the elections. Leader of the pro-Russia political party ‘Ukrainian Choice’ Viktor Medvedchuk and an ally of President Putin held a closed-door meeting Putin in Crimea on 18 AUG, during which they likely refined the Kremlin’s strategy of returning Kyiv to its sphere of influence. The Kremlin will seek to exploit and foster the growing political instability in order to fracture the pro-Western coalition and boost its political proxies in Ukraine. Poroshenko and the reformists must address core governance issues ahead of the 2019 elections, particularly by taking decisive anti-corruption measures, or risk losing control of the government.

The U.S. advanced legislation intended to bolster its military support to Ukraine, although additional efforts will be needed to counteract the Kremlin’s multifaceted subversion campaign. The U.S. Congress passed a bill allocating $500 million to Ukrainian defense on 19 SEP that includes a provision authorizing the supply of lethal defensive aid. This is a critical step in supporting the AFU’s efforts to reform into a modern military force capable of defending Ukraine. The U.S. and its partners must nonetheless take a comprehensive approach to successfully counter the Kremlin’s destabilization of Ukraine, including economic incentives and pressures to encourage Ukraine to pursue reforms. The West should not be distracted by the Kremlin’s disingenuous negotiating proposal, and keep pressure on the Kremlin to remove its forces from Ukraine.
















Moscow Presses in the Mediterranean

By Charles Frattini III and Genevieve Casagrande

Key Takeaway: Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to leverage uncontested basing in the Eastern Mediterranean to demonstrate Russian naval capabilities, while asserting its freedom of action on NATO’s southern flank. Russia focused on showcasing the increased cruise missile capability of its Black Sea Fleet’s permanent Mediterranean Task Force (MTF) from August – October 2017. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on August 25 that both sea and airborne cruise missiles were successfully utilized during a coordinated attack on ISIS positions for the first time since Russia’s entry into the Syrian Civil War in September 2015.[1] Russia deployed two previously non-combat tested submarines to its Tartous naval base along the Syrian coast on August 28, signaling Russia’s continued prioritization of combat experience for the MTF.[2] The two submarines later executed their first combat operation with Kalibr cruise missiles against ISIS in Eastern Syria on September 14.[3] September marked the highest frequency of Russian Kalbir cruise missiles strikes in a single month in 2017. The Kremlin meanwhile demonstrated its continued desire to challenge U.S. and NATO forces in the Mediterranean through the deployment of additional naval vessels and a second S-400 long-range air defense system to Syria.[4] Russia briefly deployed the Admiral Grigorovich to the Syrian theater under the guise of participation in a bilateral cultural festival between Russia and Greece from September 27 – October 1.[5] The Admiral Grigorovich cut its deployment short and rotated back to Sevastopol in Russian-occupied Crimea (Ukraine) on October 4, likely due to mechanical error.[6] The Grigorovich has routinely rotated between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean since June 2016.[7] Moscow’s expanding footprint in Tartous underscores the Kremlin’s intent to use its positions on the Syrian coast to establish Russia as a permanent regional power and challenge the Unites States and NATO in the longterm.[8]




[1]Russian Forces Try Out Air, Sea-based Missiles on Syrian Battlefield for First Time”, TASS Russian News Agency, August 25, 2017, http://tass(.)com/defense/962021
[2] “Newest Kolpino and Velikiy Novgorod Submarines of the Black Sea Fleet Reached the Mediterranean Sea”, Russian Ministry of Defense, August 28, 2017, http://eng.mil(.)ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12140110@egNews
[3] “Two Russian Subs Attack Islamic State in Syria with Kalibr Cruise Missiles”, TASS Russian News Agency, September 14, 2017, http://tass(.)com/defense/965616 ; “Veliky Novgorod and Kolpino Submarines Fired the Kalibr Cruise Missiles from Submerged Position Against ISIS Critical Objects in Syria”, Russian Ministry of Defense, September 14, 2017, http://eng.mil(.)ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12142271@egNews
[4] Jeremy Binny and Sean O’Connor, “Second Russian S-400 in Syria Confirmed”, HIS Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 29, 2017, http://www.janes.com/article/74500/second-russian-s-400-in-syria-confirmed
[5] “Russia’s Admiral Grigorovich Frigate Sails to Mediterranean Sea”, TASS Russian News Agency, September 25, 2017, http://tass(.)com/defense/967331 ; [“Frigate ‘Admiral Grigorovich’ Left the Greek Port of Kerkyra”], RIA Novosti, October 1, 2017, https://ria(.)ru/defense_safety/20171001/1505950486.html
[6] [“Russian Frigate Admiral Grigorovich has Returned from a Campaign in the Mediterranean”], Interfax.RU, October 4, 2017, http://www.interfax(.)ru/russia/581685
[7] [“The Newest Frigate of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Grigorovic, Arrived in Sevastopol”], Russian Ministry of Defense, June 10, 2016, http://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12087043@egNews ; [“Frigate of the Black Sea Fleet Admiral Grigorovich Arrives on the Greek Island of Corfu”], Russian Ministry of Defense, September 28, 2016, http://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12097268@egNews ;  [“Frigate ‘Admiral Grigorovich’ Black Sea Fleet Will Leave Greece After Participating in the ‘Russian Week on the Ionian Islands’”], Russian Ministry of Defense, October 3, 2016, http://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12098260@egNews ; [“The Newest Frigate of the Black Sea Fleet Admiral Grigorovich returned to Sevastopol from the Mediterranean Sea”], Russian Ministry of Defense, December 19, 2016, http://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12106640@egNews ; [“Frigate of the Black Sea Fleet ‘Admiral Grigorovich’ left Sevastopol in the Mediterranean Sea”], Russian Ministry of Defense, February 27, 2017, http://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12113035@egNews ; “Russian Frigate Heads to Mediterranean on Syria Mission – Source”, Reuters, February 27, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-russia-navy/russian-frigate-heads-to-mediterranean-on-syria-mission-source-idUSKBN166177 ; “Russian Missile Frigate Returns to Mediterranean”, RT, April 8, 2017, https://www.rt(.)com/news/384022-russian-missile-frigate-mediterranean-syria/ ; [“Frigate of the Black Sea Fleet Admiral Grigorovich Arrived in Sevastopol from the Mediterranean Sea”], Russian Ministry of Defense, July 12, 2017, http://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12133028@egNews
[8] Charles Frattini III and Genevieve Casagrande, “Russia’s Mediterranean Threat to NATO, Institute for the Study of War, July 13, 2017, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2017/07/russias-med-threat-to-nato.html

Friday, October 6, 2017

Cascading Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan

By: Elizabeth Teoman with Noah Ringler and the ISW & CTP Teams

Key Takeaway: Iraqi Kurdistan’s drive for independence is generating new regional alignments that deepen Iranian – and potentially Russian – influence in Iraq at the expense of the United States. Turkey, Iran, and Iraq adopted a coordinated, aggressive force posture in retaliation for the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) independence referendum on September 25, 2017. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) conducted military exercises on the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan with the Turkish Armed Forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, and Iranian Artesh. Turkey and Iran implemented a ban on direct flights from Northern Iraq on September 29. The ISF has also begun to establish security checkpoints at border crossings from Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey and Iran. The tripartite has yet to enact economic embargos, although the three states threatened to block crude oil exports from the KRG following a temporary ban by Iran. Turkey, Iran, and Iraq nonetheless remain unlikely to escalate militarily in the near term. The U.S. has opposed the KRG’s unilateral campaign on the grounds that it will harm the prospects for a unified, independent, and representative Iraq. The tripartite response and Iran’s growing role also threaten that goal. 

The tripartite cooperation between Turkey, Iran, and Iraq builds upon preexisting multilateral frameworks that ultimately expand Iran’s regional influence and undercut American influence. Russia, Iran, and Syria have begun coopting elements of the Iraqi government into a ‘Quartet’ for operations along the Syrian-Iraqi Border. Russia and Iran have also drawn Turkey into a diplomatic process that favors their own interests through the Astana Talks on the Syrian Civil War. Iran will exploit these overlapping forums to expand and legitimize its destabilizing involvement in Iraq, Syria, and the wider Middle East. Russia also sees opportunity in these forums. It has set conditions to engage more deeply in Iraq amidst the uncertainty surrounding the KRG’s drive for independence. These forums will undermine the prospects for establishing independent, representative, and unitary states in Iraq and Syria – a requirement for achieving broader U.S. objectives.
                                           
The Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute identified increasing regional instability and additional flashpoints as likely outcomes of the referendum in a joint estimate and forecast published in September 2017.


Thursday, October 5, 2017

Russia Hedges in Iraqi Kurdistan

By Bradley Hanlon with Genevieve Casagrande

Key Takeaway: Russia will not act decisively either against or in support of the movement for Kurdish independence in Iraq. Russia will instead posture as neutral regarding the potential declaration of independence by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) given Moscow’s competing interests and partnerships with Iran, Turkey, and KRG President Masoud Barzani. Russia will nonetheless position itself to seize low-risk opportunities as the U.S., Turkey, and Iran take steps to isolate Iraqi Kurdistan.

  • Russia will only play a peripheral role in Iraqi Kurdistan amidst the potential declaration of independence by the KRG. Moscow will continue to remain neutral regarding the crisis in order to position itself to take advantage of U.S. policies that may alienate Barzani and Iraqi Kurds. Russia is poised to seize economic opportunities with the KRG, but only those that pose little risk to its relationship to Iran or Turkey. These opportunities may position Russia to play an increased role in post-ISIS Iraq in the future, however.
  • Russia’s vested interests in Kurdistan are primarily economic. Russia has entered into a number of energy agreements with the KRG including the funding of gas pipelines, exploration and investment in oil blocks, and pre-financing of oil exports. Moscow also has political interests in Iraqi Kurdistan and maintains historical relations with the Barzani family as Masoud Barzani’s father, Mustafa Barzani, lived in exile in the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 50s. Russia will nonetheless seek to balance the protection of these interests with the promotion of Moscow’s role as a security guarantor and economic partner in Iraq, particularly in the event of an outbreak of violence in Iraqi Kurdistan.
  • Moscow’s policy towards Iraqi Kurdistan will remain patient, opportunistic, and reactionary. Russia has set conditions for future cooperation with both Arbil and Baghdad in recent months. As a result, the Kremlin simply has to wait for opportunities to arise within the Government of Iraq or the KRG. Russia’s neutrality will prevent the alienation of any potential or current allies, allowing Moscow to capitalize on the outcome of conflict, while avoiding blame for any potential violence. Russia is posturing to compete with the U.S. as an ally of Barzani, for example. However, the U.S. remains far closer to Barzani as of October 2017.
  • Russia is unlikely to use military force in Iraqi Kurdistan, despite recent deployments and exercises by Iran, Turkey, and Iraqi Security Forces along the Turkish and Iranian borders with northern Iraq. Instead, Russia may seek to increase diplomatic engagement with Iraq, Iran, Turkey, or the KRG in order to secure the Kremlin’s energy interests in the case of an outbreak of violence. Russia may also increase diplomatic engagement in anticipation of one of these actors becoming the key powerbroker in Kurdistan as a result of the conflict.
For additional reading on Russia’s likely courses of action in Iraq, read ISW and CTP’s latest Intelligence Estimate and Forecast, here.